1. The "relational criterion" for moral status holds that:
Correct. The relational view holds that moral status is not purely a function of intrinsic properties — it is partly constituted by our actual relational practices of care and recognition.
The relational criterion is about social practices of recognition and care — not about personal relationships, biological ties, or legal grants specifically.
2. AlphaGo's successor AlphaZero taught itself chess, shogi, and Go. Why does this still count as narrow AI?
Correct.
Incorrect. The three games share structural features. AlphaZero's skills do not transfer beyond this specific game family — it remains narrow despite multi-game mastery.
3. The "brain simulator reply" to the Chinese Room proposes that understanding would arise if the program simulates what?
Correct. The brain simulator reply proposes neuron-by-neuron simulation. Searle countered: simulating a brain is not having a brain — simulation ≠ instantiation.
Not correct. The brain simulator reply proposes neuron-by-neuron simulation of an actual Chinese speaker's brain, which Searle counters with the simulation/instantiation distinction.
4. Charles Spearman's "g factor" is best described as:
Correct.
Incorrect. g is a statistical construct from correlations among test scores.
5. Roland Barthes' "death of the author" is relevant to AI creativity because:
Correct. Barthes argued human writing assembles cultural precedent rather than expressing pure originals — AI does this explicitly and literally, making Barthes' literary theory newly pressing in the age of generative AI.
Barthes' argument was that all texts are assembled from prior cultural material — a claim AI makes literal and explicit, challenging the idea that authenticity requires a pure individual inner source.
6. John Locke's memory theory of personal identity implies that AI memory systems are:
Correct. If Locke is right that identity consists in memory continuity, then anything that manages, curates, or shapes our memory is participating in identity constitution — not merely serving as a neutral tool.
Locke's memory theory implies AI memory management is identity-relevant: what memories we have, encounter, and lose are partly constitutive of who we are — making AI curation philosophically significant.
7. David Chalmers introduced the "hard problem of consciousness" in a landmark paper published in which year?
Correct. Chalmers' paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" appeared in the Journal of Consciousness Studies in 1995 and has since been cited over 10,000 times.
The paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" was published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies in 1995.
8. Colin McGinn's "mysterianism" holds that:
Correct. McGinn's mysterianism proposes that, like a dog constitutionally incapable of calculus, the human mind may lack the cognitive equipment necessary to understand how physical processes produce consciousness.
McGinn's mysterianism holds that we are cognitively closed to the solution of the hard problem — our minds lack the capacity to grasp how physical processes give rise to consciousness, just as a dog cannot grasp calculus.
9. Global Workspace Theory was developed by Bernard Baars and later elaborated computationally by whom?
Correct. Dehaene and Changeux at CNRS provided the computational neuroscience elaboration of Baars's Global Workspace Theory.
Not correct. Baars's theory was elaborated computationally by Stanislas Dehaene and Jean-Pierre Changeux at CNRS in France.
10. What property of mental states does Searle say syntax can never generate?
Correct. Intentionality — the property of being about something — is what Searle argues cannot arise from formal symbol manipulation alone.
Not correct. Intentionality — the "aboutness" of mental states — is what Searle says syntax cannot generate.
11. A "moral patient" is an entity that:
Correct. Moral patiency is about being the kind of thing that can be wronged — it is distinct from moral agency.
That describes a moral agent. Patiency is about being the subject of harm or benefit, not the maker of moral judgments.
12. New Zealand's 2017 Te Awa Tupua Act is philosophically significant for AI ethics because it:
Correct. The river's personhood was not grounded in consciousness claims, showing legal standing can decouple from sentience.
The act concerned a river, not AI — but its logic (legal standing without consciousness) is the philosophically relevant precedent.
13. The Pinchas Gutter interactive biography project is philosophically significant because:
Correct. When a person consents to their AI extension and it draws on actual memories, saying "it isn't really him" requires engaging seriously with what makes something "really" a person — not just asserting the obvious.
The project's significance is that Gutter's consent and the system's accuracy make simple dismissals harder — they push us toward more rigorous engagement with theories of personal identity and continuation.
14. The main conclusion of Searle's Chinese Room argument is that:
Correct. Searle's central claim is that manipulating symbols according to rules (syntax) can produce correct outputs without any semantic content — understanding requires something beyond formal manipulation.
Searle's main point is that running the right program — having the right syntax — is not sufficient for understanding, which requires genuine semantics that he believes only biology can produce.
15. The "dual risk" framework in AI moral status governance identifies the two failure modes as:
Correct. The dual risk is specifically about the two ways we can get the moral status question wrong — in either direction — each with serious consequences.
The dual risk is specifically about moral status extension: getting it wrong in the direction of over-attribution or under-attribution, both of which have serious costs.
16. The "staged welfare threshold" framework proposed by legal scholars would:
Correct. The staged threshold approach allows governance to evolve with evidence, avoiding both premature restriction and waiting forever for philosophical resolution.
The threshold framework is proportionate and graduated — not immediate full status, not a ban, and explicitly designed to avoid needing philosophical consensus first.
17. In 2023, the anonymous creator "ghostwriter977" released an AI song using cloned voices of Drake and The Weeknd. The primary philosophical question it raised was:
Correct. The case forced the question: if listeners responded genuinely, and the emotional content was real, does the AI origin undermine the work's authenticity — and what exactly does authenticity require?
The philosophical question was about authenticity: what makes creative work genuine when AI can generate it and millions respond to it emotionally.
18. George Herbert Mead's theory of the social self implies which concern about AI social actors?
Correct. Mead's view makes AI social actors philosophically significant: if the self emerges through social interaction, AI at scale is not merely reflecting selves back — it is participating in making them.
Mead's theory implies that AI social actors are participating in the very process by which selves are formed — making their design, incentives, and effects on identity directly relevant to social philosophy.
19. The open letter opposing the European Parliament's 2017 "electronic personhood" proposal was primarily concerned that:
Correct. Signatories including Joanna Bryson argued the proposal would shield corporate liability and confused legal instruments with moral concern.
The opposition focused on accountability gaps and conceptual confusion — not on intelligence thresholds or insufficient welfare protection.
20. The "animal welfare analogy" as a governance template is valuable because it shows:
Correct. Animal welfare law decoupled protection from proof of consciousness — using functional evidence instead. This is the transferable governance insight.
The analogy is about governance structure, not about equivalence or existing legal application. Its key lesson is decoupling protection from consciousness proof.